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Abstract 
Never before has the world been globalized to such an extent, which results in a rapid 
exploitation of global commons and natural resources and has cross-border effects on 
biological diversity and climate change. As a consequence, there is a new urgency in 
making global cooperation in environmental politics work. Although there is a broad 
consensus that systemic change is needed, progress towards the latter—first, through 
corresponding global agreements and, second, through effective implementation of 
those policies at home—seems to lag behind expectations. How can these gaps be 
explained? And how can new scientific insights help to make environmental politics 
more effective? Notwithstanding the importance of non-behavioural factors as 
explanations from the 'outside', the author argues that explanations also have to focus 
on the 'inside', i.e. individual motivation. The key interest is to better understand the 
motivational process of individuals who are willing to undergo sustainable change 
behaviour and to conceptualize the results for further research. This turns human 
behaviour into an important risk factor in global cooperation and cognition into its 
relevant feature. This work is on conceptualization with a qualitative methodology and 
is structured as follows: In order to better grasp the meaning of 'poor' systemic change 
through environmental politics, the introductory part describes global cooperation as a 
system and identifies three cognitive blindspots, which need further analysis. As a 
corresponding literature review proves rich in insights but is too implicit for the further 
analysis, the author provides her own scheme through which the motivational process 
is sequenced and linked to the system around the individual. This allows new 
perspectives on how to discuss change behaviour in globally initiated knowledge 
production, learning and trial and error adaptations. The conclusions consider what the 
results obtained so far imply for further research on environmental politics. 
Keywords  
Global environmental politics, human motivation, cognition, sustainability, systemic 
change 
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Environmental Politics and the Human Being:  
A New Interdisciplinary Perspective on 
Motivational Processes and Sustainable 
Change Behaviour 
 
Bettina Burger-Menzel 
1 'The future we want for all' OR the Story of (still) Poor 
Systemic Change 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Article 5):  
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as 
appropriate, cooperate with other Contracting Parties, 
directly or where appropriate, through competent 
international organizations, in respect of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual 
interest, for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity. 
UN (1992) 
The human mind is something of an embarrassment to 
certain disciplines, notably economics, decision theory 
and others that have found the model of the rational 
consumer to be a powerfully productive one ... It is like 
a complex piece of machinery that has a mind of its 
own, and is not disposed to be our obedient servant. 
Schelling (1986) 
 
Technical progress and economic and geopolitical dynamics have globalized our 
world and its environmental challenges, which are the exploitation of global 
commons such as the high seas, transboundary pollution or the local cumulative 
effects of reduced natural resources. Global problems are not new. But their scale, 
scope and complexity have increased and more than justify international actions 
that aim at sustainable development and environmental change, thereby 
contributing to human security.   
Apart from equality and human rights, the United Nations (UN 2013) therefore 
names sustainability as one of the three principles which constitute the post-2015 
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Development Agenda; environmental sustainability itself is one of the four 
dimensions of development where progress is needed (grey-coded in Figure 1).   
Figure 1: 'The future we want for all' 
 
Based on UN (2013) 
 
Well-defined multi-stakeholder partnerships should then be mainstreamed under 
each thematic goal in order to 'better reflect the contributions of voluntary and 
purpose-specific partnerships, which could be coordinated and linked to the 
priority needs of developing countries in a more systematic manner' (UN 2013). 
Despite a broad consensus that governments and other stakeholders should act 
to reach 'the future we want for all', progress towards the latter—through global 
agreements and their effective implementation at home—seems to lag behind 
expectations.  
The UN (2013) itself points out that '[d]espite the ability of partnerships to 
mobilize resources, advocate for important issues and share knowledge, they have 
a poor record of promoting systemic change'. And for the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), which tackles the conservation of species and 
ecosystems, Zelli, Gupta and van Asselt (2012) state that 'interlinkage management 
efforts to the biodiversity convention have yielded little effect to date'. 
Yet providing scientific answers to the 'why' question does not come easy. Due to 
the given context’s complexities, global cooperation research spawns a huge 
variety of disciplines to cover all angles. There is primatology research on key 
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contexts like aggression, reconciliation, third party alliance or intervention (e.g. 
Thierry 2000), cognitive anthropology with issues like knowledge structures and 
cultural stereotyping (e.g. Medin, Ross et al. 2006), experimental economics on 
cooperation, offer behaviour, trust and risk preferences (e.g. Henrich 2000), 
evolutionary sociology dealing with altruism in humans (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 
2013) and, last but not least, political science ranging from topics like the 
perception of power, historical memory and negotiation procedures to compliance 
and enforcement (e.g. von Stein 2010).  
Notwithstanding the value of each disciplinary contribution, such a scientific 
landscape bears the risk of fragmentation and specialization where the human 
being might even get ignored as a decisive factor. Messner, Guarín and Haun (2013) 
therefore suggest a 'behaviourally-sound theory' when analyzing global 
cooperation.  
This paper tries to link disciplines as well as to integrate human behaviour in a 
qualitative way. Its key interest is to better understand the motivational process of 
those individuals who are willing to practice sustainable behaviour and to 
conceptualize the results for further research. Let me suggest the following lead 
questions for structuring the paper: 
Chapter 2: How does human behaviour relate to systemic change and what turns it 
into a risk factor? In this introductory part, the goal is to underline the need to 
discuss global cooperation as a system, thereby offering new perspectives on 
actors, relationships and the scaling-up of change. Analogies will be drawn from 
innovation-system research, which has a rich and interdisciplinary tradition and 
acknowledges human nature as an impact factor. With reference to the real world 
of biodiversity-related politics, three motivational challenges are identified and 
defined as cognitive blindspots in order to highlight how difficult it is to get an 
individual's change behaviour started and to make it ongoing and even sustainable.  
Chapter 3: How does science explain motivational challenges to sustainable change 
behaviour and which solutions are offered? The goal is to take stock of that part of 
literature which discusses the human motivation to undergo behavioural changes. I 
draw from a wealth of interdisciplinary contributions on the human being to show 
that the dominant discussion is either context-related but deals with motivational 
processes rather implicitly or it describes the individual as someone motivationally 
complex but lacks in context-specificity.  
Chapter 4: What does this outcome mean for the conceptualization of human 
behaviour in environmental politics? The goal is to create a context-specific 
understanding of the human motivation to undergo learning and adaptations over 
time even if the system around the individual increases in complexity. Because all 
humans are 'run' by cognition, I argue in favour of using cognition as the basic 
descriptor for all global cooperation stakeholders regardless of how different they 
are from each other. The motivational process itself is conceptualized as a 
sequential arrangement with two subparts, i.e. a basic motivational process and a 
motivational feedback loop. Both subparts relate to those challenges which come 
with increased system complexity. 
The final chapter offers conclusions on the results. Empirically relevant aspects 
will be highlighted and interpreted for the further study of global cooperation. 
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2  The Context: Human Behaviour as a Risk Factor in Global 
Environmental Politics  
Studying group membership as having a uniform 
influence on members only makes sense if 
membership itself is uniform: if every group member 
shares the same relation to the group. This is rarely 
the case. Even when something that would be 
recognised as a 'group' exists, some members are 
more or less committed, more or less tied to other 
group members, more or less identified with the 
group or more or less recognised by others  
as co-members of the group. 
Marin and Wellman (2011)  
2. 1  Global Environmental Politics as a System  
Systemic performance largely depends on how actors 'tick' and 'relate' to each 
other as elements of a collective system of knowledge creation, learning and 
adaptation. Incorporating such a perspective into the analysis of global cooperation 
tracks the mentioned 'poor record of promoting systemic change' back to the actor 
itself and to the relevant questions of how to get individuals involved in real own 
change behaviour. Such a perspective can help to enrich corresponding (policy) 
strategies through aspects that include motivational structures and personal multi-
role environments and their changes over time.  
Global cooperation research commonly focuses on determinants like power 
distribution, external constraints, extrinsic incentive systems and strategies. Thus, 
'in theorizing international relations and global governance the insights gained by 
the behavioural sciences beyond rational choice have been so far largely ignored' 
(Messner, Guarín et al. 2013).  
Richerzhagen (2014), who provides an interesting analysis of the architecture of 
biodiversity governance, additionally states: 'So far, much research has been done 
on the conditions under which multilateral agreements were established or how 
they function. Only little research has addressed the question of how such 
agreements evolve over time ...'. 
Yet it is not only agreements which change in an evolutionary way; so do people, 
their interrelationships, choices and actions. Therefore, global cooperation requires 
a deeper understanding of the human being.  
People are sources and sinks of new (embodied) knowledge and are connected by 
corresponding flows. This is highlighted in policy dialogues like the G20's Action 
Plan for knowledge sharing and mutual learning (G20 2013). Knowledge sharing 
itself is linked to 'the provision of task information and know-how to help others 
and to collaborate with others to solve problems, develop new ideas, or implement 
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policies and procedures' (Wang and Noe 2009). Who are these actors of global 
cooperation?  
At the international level, governments usually make it the task of their 
experienced chief diplomats to prepare corresponding meetings (pre-negotiation 
phase) and to bargain over the contractual content (negotiation phase) at the locus 
of negotiation, which is often organized by multilateral entities like the United 
Nations and its Secretariat. These actors 'gather information, exchange ideas, 
formulate proposals, and meet in informal and formal sessions to negotiate, 
prepare legal documents, and vote whether or not to accept new responsibilities, 
including taxing themselves to cover the costs of monitoring their global 
environmental management efforts. They meet periodically to review how well 
they have done and determine whether or not to take further action' (Susskind 
1994).  
At a national and lower level, assignments are then handed over to governmental 
representatives from topic-related ministries in order to make ratification and 
implementation happen (post-negotiation phase). If contractual gaps need to be 
filled, a renegotiation process will take place. 
Figure 2 provides a simplified scheme of the proposed diffusion system. It 
visualizes the (re-)negotiation and post-negotiation phases, between which a global 
agreement turns into a national assignment and back. At all levels, stakeholders 
relate with each other to help to establish and diffuse those behavioural changes 
which are intended by an international agreement. Stakeholders can be 
governmental bodies as well as actors from outside government such as (multi-) 
national companies, universities, interest groups including environmental action 
groups and local (traditional) communities.  
Figure 2: Global cooperation as a diffusion system 
 
Based on Burger-Menzel (2014a) 
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Change behaviour would occur when all relevant actors start to think and behave 
differently. But what does this mean in a systemic context? And can it be described 
through compliance, as in international law?  
Compliance is defined 'as the degree to which state behaviour conforms to what 
the agreement prescribes or proscribes. This is straightforward enough, but it is 
important to differentiate compliance from effectiveness—the degree to which the 
agreement has an impact on state behaviour. It is possible for a state to abide fully 
by the terms of the agreement, but for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
agreement itself' (von Stein 2010).  
Against that background, it seems helpful to create an understanding of systemic 
change processes through a complementary research field that provides a stronger 
focus on cause-effect relationships, i.e. innovation-system research. Innovation-
system research offers useful heuristics because it analyses actors (nodes), their 
interactions (ties) and contextual environments (especially institutions and 
knowledge base) as an interrelated whole. It is here that the author's 
understanding as an economist is rooted (e.g. Burger-Menzel 2011; Burger-Menzel 
and Huyoff 2015).  
Such technical progress has been conceptualized as 'technological trajectories', 
'techno-economic paradigms', 'diffusion systems of innovation' or 'systems of 
interactive learning' (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1977; Dosi 1982; Freeman and Perez 
1984; Porter 1990; Rogers 2003; Freeman and Soete 2004; Fagerberg, Mowery et 
al. 2005; Perez 2009; Malerba and Nelson 2010; Lundvall 2010).  
The following analogies in causal challenges and context complexities can be 
identified between innovation systems and global cooperation: 
 Innovation systems are built around technical novelties (e.g. computers) 
that start as breakthrough inventions and—after often lengthy and costly 
research and development—are successfully commercialized and 
diffused in markets. Global agreements, too, aim at the adoption of 
something relatively new when compared with the corresponding status 
quo in the target countries (e.g. technical standards or legal regulations).  
 There is only diffusion if individuals are or become convinced that the 
adoption of a specific change (new product or process) is of value to 
them. Such a decision might be followed by cognitive dissonance. In the 
case of continued change behaviour, diffusion scales up through activities 
which create consensus and collective action. And adaptive problems 
make it necessary to find new reliable and resourceful partners. The 
implementation of global policies is also directed towards change 
behaviour of individuals and groups and therefore needs an understanding 
of the underlying motivational and network processes. 
 As 'new destroys old', i.e. creative destruction in the Schumpeterian 
sense, innovations meet resistance. Not only are 'hard factors' like 
established production systems and value-added chains challenged in 
their organizational structures and processes. 'Soft factors' like 
established management cultures, relationships of collaboration, 
consumer behaviour and lifestyles also face substantial changes. Globally 
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intended change behaviour also leads to 'new destroys old'. Thus, there 
will be opposing social forces or inert institutional frameworks in the target 
countries that must be tackled while collaborative knowledge 
production, learning and forgetting as well as trial and error adaptations 
(should) take place. 
 Diffusion is successful within an innovation system when, at the end, not 
only has the productive sphere been transformed but people have 
started to think and behave differently. Thus, there is a new common 
sense in the economy and society as well as in corresponding socio-
institutional frameworks. The implementation of global agreements also 
involves a management of change that needs to be based on a new 
shared sense, thereby expressing that (more than) a critical mass in 
society has accepted what was aspired to reach. 
 And finally, given the complex historical, political and social realities in 
the countries concerned, there will be informational insecurity during the 
whole process of diffusion. During their lifecycle, innovations undergo 
basic processes of trial and error, imitation and variation, selection and 
retention for uses across sector borders and diverse user groups. There 
are constant risks to (the perception of) utilities and profit gains, also due 
to technical path dependencies. Only if individual and cumulative 
experience can be identified, measured and explained is it easier, in 
principle, to predict likely future system patterns and their consequences. 
Negotiation and implementation of global goals are a form of risk 
management, as is the diffusion of innovations. 
Apart from these analogies, there are topic overlaps. Most innovation systems 
are cross-border systems and therefore subject to global agreements. One 
example is the biotechnological sector, which is affected by two global agreements 
(Soria López and Burger-Menzel 2014), i.e. the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), which tackles biodiversity loss and conservation including related traditional 
knowledge, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS).  
To sum up, global cooperation can be interpreted as a diffusion system for 
something which is relatively new for its actors. And as innovation-system research, 
it can profit from 'thinking in systems', i.e. there is a substantial willingness among 
researchers to cover analytical levels from micro to macro as well as to collaborate 
across disciplines (e.g. evolutionary economics) and to see human behaviour and its 
patterns as being 'in flux'.  
In all these approaches, contextualism means reflecting on the agential milieu 
because the latter affects how networks are mobilized and evolve along 
technological development paths. This is valid for the whole variety of actors such 
as firms, universities, research institutes, user groups and governments and their 
embeddedness in broad societal structures. 
Figure 3 focuses on human behaviour as a precondition for systemic change. It 
does so by separating behavioural aspects (e.g. attitudes, values, needs) from 
environmental conditions and options (e.g. absorption and reform capacities, 
financial support). It thus stresses that the understanding of systemic change must 
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come not only from non-behavioural factors, i.e. explanations from the 'outside', 
but also from psychology, i.e. explanations from the 'inside' on all levels (individual, 
group, society). 
 
Figure 3: Human behaviour as a precondition for systemic change 
 
Based on Burger-Menzel and Assadi (2012: 256) 
In this paper, the sole focus is on the individual willingness to undergo behavioural 
challenges in favour of global environmental policies. A future research paper will 
pick up from here and deal with those individual capabilities that are needed to 
scale up change behaviour in networks.  
2.2 Introducing Cognitive Blindspots as a Risk Factor 
Let me now point out those individual(ly intended) 'cognitive blindspots' in global 
cooperation, which have triggered this research. In what follows, negotiation and 
implementation processes are no longer distinguished because they basically 
create the same types of cognitive blindspots. 
As to theory, I will use the transaction-cost approach, which offers a 
comprehensive reflection on (non-)cooperative behaviour and belongs to the 
heterodox body of thought connected with innovation systems. Although much of 
this academic discussion concentrates on private entities (e.g. companies), it can 
also be applied to non-private entities, such as governments. The reason is that the 
latter qualifies as a kind of 'super-firm' with power of a special kind because 
'government has at its disposal the police and the other law enforcement agencies 
to make sure that its regulations are carried out' (Coase 1960).  
The context of environmental politics will be illustrated with reference to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (UN 1992). There is a variety of international 
frameworks, which tackle the conservation of species and ecosystems. However, 
the CBD with its follow-up protocols is the most comprehensive and inclusive 
international agreement (O'Neill 2009) with currently 196 parties (UN 2015). Its 
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latest supplementary agreement is the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization (UN 2011).  
The parties to the CBD are extremely diverse. A basic distinction can be made 
between provider and user countries. While provider countries are relatively rich in 
biodiversity, user countries are relatively dependent on the providers' input. This 
input consists of genetic resources from animals, plants and microorganisms and is 
valuable because it can be used to develop specialty enzymes, enhanced genes, or 
small molecules, which can then be exploited for crop protection, drug 
development, the production of specialized chemicals or in industrial processing 
(Parayil 2003; Soria López and Burger-Menzel 2014). Finding a practical way to 
share these benefits has been of particular concern to biodiversity-rich developing 
countries.  
Providers and users which cooperate with good intentions ideally proceed as 
follows: The countries ratify the Convention and set up legally binding frameworks, 
which help users to access genetic resources for biotechnology research, 
development and market-related activities in return for a fair and equitable share 
of any benefits from their use (ABS). If traditional knowledge is associated with 
genetic resources, its value is respected and transformed into benefits for the 
indigenous and local communities where the knowledge stems from. The idea 
behind this approach is a bilateral system of 'specialized payments for an 
ecosystem services... scheme that attempts to monetize the commercial value of 
biodiversity' (Richerzhagen 2014).  
The CBD therefore entails a great deal of organizational and procedural effort on 
behalf of all governmental bodies and third parties involved. In an online factsheet 
on the Nagoya Protocol, the Australian Government (2012) describes it as follows:  
Each Party to the Protocol must establish rules that genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge used in their 
jurisdiction have been acquired legally. Each Party must also 
establish one or more 'checkpoints' to gather information on the 
source of the genetic resources, the establishment of mutually 
agreed terms and the use of the genetic resources. In several 
countries such checkpoints already exist in public funding 
processes, in import regulations or in patent offices. Australia 
has yet to decide how to implement its checkpoint. Users will 
need to demonstrate at Protocol checkpoints that the genetic 
resources they use were legally acquired. Permits issued by 
Australia meet these standards ...  
A 'competent national authority' authorised to make a decision 
on access must be publicly identified for each country—and they 
must provide a decision in writing in a cost effective manner and 
within a reasonable time. Where access is granted, a permit 
must be issued to enable researchers to demonstrate their 
compliance with the access rules. When the permit is lodged on 
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the [United Nation's, the author] International Access and 
Benefit-Sharing Clearing House, it becomes an internationally 
recognised certificate... Where scientific research and 
development on genetic resources uses indigenous traditional 
knowledge, countries have to make sure that the knowledge 
was acquired in accordance with the rules of the country where 
those indigenous people live. The knowledge should be accessed 
with the prior informed consent of the indigenous community 
providing the knowledge, and on mutually agreed terms ...  
The Australian Government is consulting with the research 
community, indigenous people, industry partners and state and 
territory governments to find the best way to implement the 
Protocol in Australia ... 
What qualifies such relationships between actors as 'cooperative'? Cooperation 
can be understood as 'engaging with others in a mutually beneficial activity' 
(Bowles and Gintis 2013), a behavioural phenomenon that is valid for all types of 
biological beings that voluntarily act together in a symbiotic, prosocial or non-
selfish way. The opposite of cooperative behaviour is competition, where 
individuals or groups of individuals work against each other for selfish reasons 
(Schmidt 2001).  
But the world of cooperative actors is not simply black and white, i.e. either they 
cooperate or not. Social psychologists like Deutsch (2012) point to self-destructive 
tendencies that are inherent in cooperation and reduce contributions which 
otherwise would be made; at the same time competition can be contributing in a 
beneficial way by providing win-win situations.  
A cooperative pattern can therefore fall (back) into competition and vice versa. 
Profiting from game-theoretical insights, economic theory has given this 
transitional character between cooperation and competition a solid form by calling 
it 'coopetition' (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). Through this neologism, 
composed of cooperation and competition, a cooperative competition is described 
where individuals or groups of individuals interact with an only partial congruence 
of interests, which makes them cooperate and compete at the same time in order 
to reach their strategic goals (Schmidtchen 2005).  
Against that background, three cognitive blindspots in cooperation can be 
identified and described as (i) the motivational challenge to start a certain change 
behaviour (short-term impact on behaviour); (ii) the motivational challenge to keep 
the chosen change behaviour ongoing (mid-term impact on behaviour); (iii) and the 
motivational challenge to undergo learning and adaptation despite internal and/or 
external complexity (long-term impact on behaviour). 
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(i) The motivational challenge to start a certain change behaviour 
Ideally, at the international level as well as within all signature countries, the 
diverse actor groups are motivated to work in the spirit of the CBD and to put the 
Convention into practice through an increasingly shared and new common sense. 
Against that background, every cooperation is a social arrangement or—as 
Williamson (1979) calls it—'relational contracting'.  
In every social arrangement, transactions are needed to connect people for joint 
tasks (e.g. sharing of information) and to bridge separate processes to avoid 
frictions (e.g. how to hand over an assignment). The more recurrent transactions 
are, the more some form of joint governance is stimulated and expressed—not 
only through organizational charts and process manuals but also through codes of 
conduct.  
Yet as indicated above, social arrangements do not necessarily imply that the 
officially intended change behaviour is actually adopted. On the one hand, 
individuals act as representatives of organizations like governments. As countries 
substantially differ (e.g. natural resources, economic structure, historical 
development, political factors), not every party might assess a cooperative 
outcome as a gain in utility. 'Sometimes, to get countries with significantly 
different needs or priorities to sign a treaty, a lowest-common-denominator or 
compromise approach is adopted. Such halfway agreements, not surprisingly, are 
often insufficient to achieve the intended results' (Susskind 1994). Acknowledging 
a state's sovereign rights to determine how to implement agreements at home—as 
stated in Article 3 of the CBD (UN 1992)—might then indicate a risk rather than an 
opportunity. 
Article 3. Principle: States have, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, the same individuals might also abstain from goal-oriented 
behaviour because the features of the given situation do not support their 
personal motivation. Thus, inherited and learned behaviour has an additional 
impact on decision-making due to human nature (e.g. ability to feel fear or shame), 
personality traits (e.g. strong intrinsic motivation) and culture. The latter 
'influences participants' views regarding what a relationship is: its goals, what goes 
into making a good one, norms and expectations for exchanges and reciprocity, 
appropriate interactions, activities and rituals involved, and things that damage or 
destroy them. It also defines what relationships are appropriate for negotiations' 
(Moore 2010).  
All the named factors can lead to inadequate goal descriptions at the global and 
lower level. Thus, there may be a lack of information on what should be reached 
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(intentionality) and/or on what the final status quo should look like (finality) and/or 
on how the acting party wants to reach the intended finality (cause-effect 
relationship) (Stein 2005). In the end and as described by political psychologists, 
'the goals, abilities, and foibles of individuals are crucial to the intentions, 
capabilities, and strategies of a state' (Byman and Pollack 2001 in Winter 2013). A 
relative independence of partners, which allows resources to be pooled in a flexible 
way, also makes it easier to only 'officially' adopt a certain change behaviour and/or 
to break away from the cooperative setting in the future. In both cases, there will 
be, at most, a short-term effect on change behaviour.  
This is where I assume a first cognitive blindspot in cooperation. Exemplary 
questions are: When are people really willing to cooperate in favour of a new 
techno-economic and socio-institutional paradigm? What does a non-existing or 
small overlap of interests mean for people’s predisposition to listen carefully to 
communication messages and to act upon them? How much 'noise' in the 
cooperation channel stems from subjectively perceived (cultural) context gaps? Can 
individual preferences change over time? And if yes, what does that mean with 
regard to the stability of behavioural solutions?  
(ii) The motivation to keep a chosen change behaviour ongoing  
Usually, relational contracts are incomplete. Gaps in such relational contracts can 
be 'faultlessly filled in an adaptive, sequential way' (Williamson 1979). According to 
Williamson, contract-specific investment will be higher if there is 
 a lack of alternative uses (lock-in);  
 specialized training and learning-by-doing in operations (asset 
specificity);  
 successful contract adaptation to unfolding events and periodic 
contract renewals (transaction-cost savings);  
 evolving familiarity (communication economies);  
 responsibility with an increasing personal and organizational stake 
(institutional and personal trust relations);  
 a personal integrity that becomes operative (moral behaviour).  
In the case of the CBD, all contractual gaps are supposed to be filled by the 
Conference of the Parties (CBD Article 23), which holds ordinary meetings at 
regular intervals; has extraordinary meetings when deemed necessary by at least 
one third of the Parties; agrees upon rules of procedure and financial rules in a 
consensual way; reviews the implementation of the Convention; and admits 
observers and allows their participation, subject to the adopted rules.  
Up to now, ten Conferences of the Parties have taken place. The last one—after 
more than six years of renegotiation—led to the above-mentioned Nagoya 
Protocol, which was adopted in 2010. Thus, over the years the Parties seem to have 
invested a lot of time and resources in improving organizational, procedural and 
communicative routines. Additionally, they have tried to foresee all kind of options 
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to solve disputes among the Parties (CBD Article 27), which include solutions such 
as negotiation; the good offices of or mediation by a third party; arbitration or 
submission to the International Court of Justice in unresolved disputes; or 
submission to conciliation.  
Conferences of the Parties and dispute settlements generally cover all measures 
defined as obligatory in the CBD (UN 1992), such as 
 General Measures for Conservation and Sustainable Use (Article 6);  
 Identification and Monitoring (Article 7);  
 In-situ Conservation (Article 8);  
 Ex-situ Conservation (Article 9);  
 Sustainable Use of Components of Biological Diversity (Article 10);  
 Incentive Measures (Article 11);  
 Research and Training (Article 12);  
 Public Education and Awareness (Article 13);  
 Impact Assessment and Minimizing Adverse Impacts (Article 14);  
 Access to Genetic Resources (Article 15);   
 Access to and Transfer of Technology (Article 16);  
 Exchange of Information (Article 17);   
 Technical and Scientific Cooperation (Article 18);  
 Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits (Article 19);   
 Financial Resources (Article 20);  
 Financial Mechanism (Article 21).  
As can be seen from all theoretical and real-world enumerations, contractual 
repair involves substantial learning and adaptation; it also requires a personal and 
social morality to be put into practice and maintained over a long time. Exposure to 
such a world of cooperation is like a steady and huge flow of incoming data, 
especially in environmental politics with its continuous production of new 
knowledge and needs. Thus, apart from the challenge of given preferences, there 
seem to be other bounds. People might simply feel overwhelmed when taking up 
new responsibilities in this field.  
This is where I assume a second cognitive blindspot. Exemplary questions are: 
What happens if continuous adaptation leads to information overload and 
cognitive stress? Can decision-relevant categories change in such situations or the 
way in which decisions are taken? What happens if decision-making affects the 
'moral mind' as well? How does the mind deal with all these challenges, especially 
in a world which has huge context gaps between stakeholders, e.g. between an 
industrial lobbyist and a member of an indigenous community? 
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(iii) The motivational challenge to transform change behaviour into a sustainable 
one  
Relational contracting is challenged by an additional phenomenon. Williamson 
(1981) also points to the fact that humans can be subject to opportunism, i.e. either 
principals or agents 'are dishonest (or, more generally, disguise attributes or 
preferences, distort data, obfuscate issues, and otherwise confuse transactions), 
and it is very costly to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic types ex 
ante'. These humans look for opportunities to pursue undisclosed personal 
advantages and, by doing so, to cover up their tracks.  
This is enabled by information asymmetries (Fritsch, Wein et al. 1999), which 
increase in complex environments and offer room for hidden motives and actions. 
'Biopiracy' can serve as such a case, when patent-protected 'novel' traits of 
biological varieties turn out to have existed prior to the filing of corresponding 
patents, with the result that traditional farming communities could have a claim to 
benefit-sharing (Lea 2008; Soria López and Burger-Menzel 2014).  
In the real world, the CBD seems to come with increased frustration, especially 
among providers of biodiversity. The Australian Government (2012) confirms:  
… Until now, the lack of a coherent standard has resulted in a 
high level of mistrust and obstacles to biodiversity research and 
its potentially valuable outcomes …   
Apart from an opportunistic interest, humans can also have an interest in their 
own being, i.e. an interest not only to 'have' but also to 'be' (Taylor 1987; Nozick 
1989). A person then gains complexity through his or her own features and their 
lifelong changes (self) as well as through more diverse social factors and group 
dynamics (me and the others).  
In global cooperation, this certainly includes the need to tackle cultural 
stereotypes, when, for example, 'negotiators from collectivistic cultures, far from 
always being cooperative, tend to be more competitive when they have strong 
egoistic motives and high aspirations' (Chen, Mannix, and Okumura 2003, quoted in 
Imai and Gelfand 2009).  
Cooperative relationships evolve over time and adaptation needs motivational 
conditions which are sufficient to overcome (informational) challenges and their 
consequences. Against that background, mistrust would qualify as an adaptive 
problem that makes it necessary to find new reliable and resourceful cooperation 
partners. But mistrust does not only point to clues on opportunistic behaviour; it 
also draws attention to emotional determinations or motivational conflicts, which 
might cast an individual into roles which contradict original intentions. Or as Hocker 
(2008) puts it: 'The "incompleteness" of contracts has increased with globalization, 
radical uncertainty and self-referential complexity'.  
This is where I assume a third and final cognitive blindspot. Exemplary questions 
are: What are needs of a cognitive self who has increased moral hazards and self-
referential complexity? Is there a tension between the 'self' and those manifold 
pragmatic expectations that dynamically evolve in (global) cooperation? Do minds 
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and a continuously changing world really fit together? Or does the mind rather 
escape from such challenges through strategies that are automatically or 
unconsciously employed?  
Let me finish with the introductory part on global cooperation and its three 
cognitive blindspots. In its 2006 resolution, the UN's General Assembly stressed the 
importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships at all levels (global, national, 
regional) and defined them 'as voluntary relationships between various parties, 
both public and non-public, in which all participants agree to work together to 
achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task, and, as mutually agreed, to 
share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits'; however, it also stressed 
that  
[d]espite the ability of partnerships to mobilize resources, 
advocate for important issues and share knowledge, they have a 
poor record of promoting systemic change (UN 2013).  
Usually, all these actors are diverse, as are their context conditions. As a 
consequence, there are goal-related context gaps, hidden motives and actions, and 
self-referential needs. Such challenges increase as a system becomes more 
complex. I have attempted to illustrate this problem by linking theoretical 
reasoning with the CBD's real world. Three motivational challenges were identified 
and defined as cognitive blindspots in order to highlight how difficult it is to get an 
individual's change behaviour started and to keep it ongoing and even sustainable.  
The following chapter attempts to find answers on how to deal with the human 
risk factor, based on a review of a rich body of interdisciplinary literature. Only 
some of these contributions stem from innovation system research because the 
latter, too, is still a learner with regard to human behaviour. 
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3  The Input: A Review of Interdisciplinary Literature on 
Human Behaviour 
We are not students of some subject matter, but 
students of problems. And problems may cut right 
across the borders of any subject matter or discipline.  
Popper (1963) 
3.1 Selected Approaches on Motivation, Cognition and Environmental 
Sustainability 
The literature on the human being is overwhelmingly dense and rich, in its 
century-spanning tradition as well as in its interdisciplinary perspectives. Broadly 
speaking, it falls into two domains. The first domain comprises a philosophical 
debate on topics such as human needs and morality, intentionality and compassion 
(e.g. Nussbaum 2001).  
The second domain is less general. As Huddy, Sears and Levy (2013) put it: 
'Individuals do not act within a vacuum. Their behaviour varies with, and responds 
to, differences in political institutions, political cultures, leadership styles, and 
social norms'. In particular, proposals for governance modes need to be context-
related; how otherwise to interpret early Utilitarians like Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes 
1651, reprint 1966) who perceived the human existence as a fight of all against all 
and called for an authoritarian sovereign? Liberal counterparts like John Locke 
(Locke 1690, reprint 1989) rather assumed a precarious peace among men and a 
government which could therefore act with the consent and goodwill of the 
governed. Last but not least, the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith (Smith 
1776, reprint 1994) reasoned that there is an interpersonal value system, which 
makes free-market mechanisms between people workable. 
Approaches with a functional view are called 'ideas of the human being' (in non-
gendered times: 'ideas of man'). These ideas are constructions by other human 
beings and can be defined as all assumptions on the nature of the individual and its 
actions which are explicitly or implicitly made by a person or a theory (Siebenhüner 
2001). Due to their explanatory function, such ideas should be consistent, plausible 
and—if possible—accessible for empirical research. And they have become an 
appreciated academic tool in numerous disciplines, as is evident from their names, 
such as homo oeconomicus, homo politicus, homo psychologicus and homo sociologicus.  
Described through its attributes, the idealized human is then integrated into 
models which try to consistently explain context-related behaviour and are 
additionally used in academic training or as a frame of reference for policy-making 
and corresponding goal-setting.  
However, the use of such ideas needs an awareness of its consequences. First, the 
researcher's prescientific vision has to be made explicit because it entails subjective 
perceptions and normative assumptions about the research object which otherwise 
could put limits to any person's understanding (Siebenhüner 2001; Kirsch 2004). A 
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famous example is the homo oeconomicus who is assumed to be purely rational and 
'mechanically' inclined towards optimizing its own utility (Saßmannshausen 2009). 
Second, methodological designs such as the homo oeconomicus are often based 
on assumptions that are so restrictive that they become inadequate as 
interpretations of reality, which makes Sedlacek (2011) ask: 'How did morality 
disappear from economics, which was originally a branch of moral science?' And he 
claims '... not to forget that economic thought is much richer than just applied math 
and we should try to understand it all if we want to talk about all human 
behaviour'.  
Third, applying behavioural models has effects, too. Siebenhüner points to 
evidence by Frank, Gilovich and Regan and to evidence by Streeten. Their studies 
show that economics graduates, who were educated with the dominant idea of a 
rational and self-centered homo oeconomicus, tended to behave less cooperatively 
than graduates of other disciplines (Frank, Gilovich et al. 1993). Such behaviour 
might have societal consequences if executed in leadership positions (Streeten 
1997). If it were political minds, such a purely rational formation could produce 
biased views on the world: 'The prevailing view among globalization's supporters is 
that markets and democracy are a kind of universal prescription for the multiple ills 
of underdevelopment. ... Working hand in hand, markets and democracy will 
gradually transform the world into a community of prosperous, war-shunning 
nations, and individuals into liberal, civic-minded citizens and consumers. In the 
process, ethnic hatred, religious zealotry, and other 'backward' aspects of 
underdevelopment will be swept away' (Chua 2004). How would somebody else 
perceive, judge and act if there were additional motivations like empathy?   
Figure 4: From pre-analytic visions to behavioural models  
and real human behaviour 
Siebenhüner 2001: 22; own translation 
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Figure 4 sums up the recursive relationship between pre-analytic visions, ideas of 
human beings, behavioural models and real-world behaviour. It shows how 
scientific explanations of human behaviour are built up through a researcher's pre-
analytic vision, interpersonally comparable assumptions and a theoretical 
framework which links attributes to incentive systems. 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been increasing pressure on mainstream 
approaches which idealize and model the human being. These approaches were 
neither able to lower uncertainties in policy issues of risk. Nor did they work as 
explanatory guides in times of crisis while environmental challenges made 
perspectives in politics shift, e.g. from 'output orientation and environmental 
repair' towards 'input orientation and care'. 
Pressure has also been added through technological and scientific progress. 
Fields such as cognitive neuroscience see the brain 'naked' and provide new 
insights into human perception and decision-making (e.g. Edelman and Tononi 
2000; Andreasen 2005; Restak 2006).  
As a consequence, there have been substantial advances in the idealization and 
modelling of the human being, which sometimes turns literature searches into 
breath-taking journeys. Yet there is no sole approach which fits all the needs of this 
research. This is due to the fact that all interdisciplinary developments vary in their 
goal, scope, depth, cognition-relatedness and contextual reference to 
environmental politics.  
Let me briefly outline some of the most valuable findings on selected 
approaches. Selection criteria were motivation, cognition and environmentally 
sustainable behaviour, which can be described as follows:  
 'Motivation refers to the initiation, choice, or persistence in specific, goal-
oriented behaviour' (Weiner 1992) while motives are certain types of 
incentives which are preferred by individuals. In order to directly 
influence behaviour and performance, an individual's motive structure 
has to match with the motivational characteristics of a given situation 
(current-state motivation). As motives differ between individuals, 
incentives might trigger different levels of state motivation (Reiss and 
Havercamp 1998). Thus, motivation is a process in which motives are 
embedded and scanned for relevance. 
 Cognition deals with those abilities and processes which determine how a 
sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored or recovered in 
the brain (Andreasen 2005). Even if the term's usage varies across 
disciplines, the larger field of cognitive science helps to achieve a better 
understanding of how people think, perceive, remember and learn and 
why motivation affects behavioural outcomes. 
 'Whatever the precise definition, sustainability science is mostly about 
complex social-ecological systems' (de Vries 2012). For their survival, 
humans depend on favourable conditions on Earth. Climate change and 
biodiversity losses therefore affect integral parts of the human existence 
and need to be tackled. This is especially true in a world which has turned 
from 'human-empty to a human-full world' (Folke 2013) and where the 
anthropogenic impact on planetary boundaries is accelerating and is not 
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an independent issue but interrelated with human existence. 
Environmental sustainability then describes a behaviour which aims to 
reduce the negative human impact on ecosystems within a broader 
societal context. 
How do recent approaches on the human being deal with these key contexts? 
Below, a basic distinction is made between approaches which are based on 
pre=scientific visions and those which are not, although this distinction is not 
always clear-cut. 
(i) Approaches without pre-scientific visions  
A first idealization which tries to comprise the human being in its totality and has 
also made its way into global cooperation research (Gadinger, Jarzebski et al. 2014) 
is the homo narrans. The approach is based on the anthropological understanding 
that each individual acquires a growing verbal and symbolic lexicon through social 
interaction. Narratives then provide a unique source which should be protected 
from the external power of interpretation. Such a '"narrative turn" in social studies' 
has an interest in texts as such and perceives them as a form of social life, a form of 
knowledge and a form of communication (Czarniawska 2004). Even analytical 
methods like 'signifier mapping' try to be a 'means to see the Other as Self, and the 
Self as Other' because they leave narratives within their contextual situatedness 
(Meriam 2010). Or as Schelling (2006) observes: 'Language is an almost completely 
adaptive behaviour. What language a person speaks depends on what languages he 
encounters, particularly within his own family... Accent, grammar and vocabulary 
are even more individualist in origin, slang being an outstanding example'.  
Another approach is to categorize ideal types of personalities based on empirical 
observations, i.e. personality traits which indicate a relative willingness in favour of 
change behaviour. Rogers (2003) describes people who are quicker than others to 
adopt an innovation (early adopters). The underlying process consists of five 
stages: Exposure to an innovation and understanding of how it works (knowledge); 
forming of a favourable or non-favourable attitude towards the proposed change 
(persuasion); attitude-driven adoption or rejection (decision); practicing of change 
behaviour (implementation); seeking of reinforcement when exposed to conflicting 
messages during adoption of and adaptation to the new practice (confirmation). At 
the last stage, a dissonant individual will feel motivated to reduce his or her 
condition of an uncomfortable state of mind through a change in his or her own 
knowledge, attitudes, or actions. As a result, an early or late adopter might not 
actually continue a certain change behaviour. According to Rogers, early adopters 
have greater empathy; have an rather open set of beliefs; are able to adopt new 
ideas on the basis of rather abstract stimuli; have greater rationality; have more 
intelligence; have more favourable attitudes towards change; are better able to 
cope with uncertainty and risk; have a more favourable attitude towards science; 
have more self-efficacy and believe that they are in control of their future; have 
higher aspirations and seek them through formal education, higher status or more 
attractive occupations. The importance of personality traits is confirmed by 
creativity research because it helps to achieve a better understanding of how 
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creative people 'tick' (e.g. Andreasen 2005) and can be used to adapt incentive 
systems to foster the creativity of employees (e.g. Frey and Osterloh 2002; Kirchler 
2008) or to improve the match between policy instruments and their target groups 
(e.g. Burger-Menzel 2011). 
(ii) Approaches with pre-scientific visions 
Modern approaches which are more strongly associated with pre-scientific visions 
aspire to no longer treat human behaviour as something of artificial security. In 
dealing with human behaviour, then, the goal is not to predict the future 'but to tell 
you what you need to know to take meaningful action in the present' (Saffo 2007).  
Let me sketch some examples from economics, where for a long time 'the 
psychological study of motivation has paralleled rather than complemented the 
economic one' (Ainslie 1986). Since the mid-1980s, an increasing number of 
interdisciplinary inputs from psychology, sociology, cognitive science and others 
has enriched the homo oeconomicus or inspired new ideas from a highly integrative 
perspective, although none of them ever made it into the mainstream:  
 The intrinsically motivated being, i.e. homo oeconomicus maturus (Frey 
1997; Frey and Neckermann 2008): This human being is still dominantly 
rational and optimizes its own utility under conditions of scarcity. But 
now, there are motivational reflections. Motivation is triggered through 
incentives, which are set by a third party (e.g. monetary or reputational 
gain), as well as intrinsically. In such a case, the being is driven by a 
continuous impulse to grow personally, a sensation of complete devotion 
and a reward due to the action itself (Heckhausen 1989).  
 Simons's boundedly rational being (Simon 1976), who experiences 
informational bounds: Related to bounds through informational scarcity 
or overload, there can also be cognitive bounds and stress when decisions 
have to be taken (Lindstädt 2006). In such situations, humans tend 
towards decisions, which can be described as cognitive shortcuts, such as 
ecological heuristics (e.g. Todd and Gigerenzer 2007).  
 The cognitively competent and socially related being, i.e. homo culturalis 
(Goldschmidt, Nutzinger et al. 2009): Culture—due to cognition—
becomes an open and unstable process that interrelates cognitively 
competent actors with different interests. These actors negotiate 
interpretations and evaluations of their world and conclude by 
compromising on their own social boundaries.  
 The multiple self as a result of impressive transdisciplinary efforts (Elster 
1986): The concept was developed by an international workgroup on 
rationality and social change comprising psychologists, philosophers, 
economists and mathematicians, and describes the individual as someone 
highly complex. With emotions, weakness of will and self-deception, the 
individual is therefore liable to make contradictory decisions and be 
affected by motivational conflicts. Along with this comes the plea to 
accept ambivalence in human behaviour (Rorty 2010).  
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Although these approaches are highly diverse, they all stress the fact that the 
need structure of humans is complex (needs relating to existence, needs for social 
relatedness, self-referential needs) as is cognition itself. There is intrinsic 
motivation (especially homo oeconomicus maturus, multiple self), cognitive decision-
making (especially cognitively bounded rationality, homo culturalis, multiple self) and 
cognitive adaptation (especially cognitively bounded rationality, homo culturalis, 
multiple self).  
Yet none of these approaches explicitly relates to the context of environmental 
politics. The multiple self might even perceive such reflections as cognitive puzzles. 
Kaebnick (2014) puts it as follows: '"Nature" can refer to the world prior to or 
independent of human meddling, or to a state of human life prior to the 
complications of civilization, or to the realm of things suitable for scientific 
investigation, or to the typical make-up of kinds of things... the understanding of 
nature [itself, the author] might be a cultural construction. Another issue is nature 
as a topic within morality'. So is there no potential for the multiple self and the 
others to practice environmentally sustainable behaviour? 
Let me follow Siebenhüner (2001), who contrasts—in a very interesting and 
detailed comparison—the homo oeconomicus, the boundedly rational being/ 
resourceful evaluative maximizing man and the multiple self. He uses attributes 
(Table 1) which he classes as important for environmentally sustainable behaviour.  
Siebenhüner's consistent 'story board' in more detail: Environmentally 
sustainable behaviour is based on an ethical claim, which can only be met by a self 
who is capable of free-will choices, thereby having the option to overcome external 
and internal restrictions (development of self). Yet sustainability cannot be reached 
by the human being alone. Therefore, it must also be able to care for others and 
nature (responsibility) and to grasp the corresponding complexity (cognitive 
abilities). Problem-solving of such a scale requires active consent to solutions 
(cooperation), sensitivity to the situation of others (empathy) and the ability to 
reach consensus through critical discourse (communication). As context-based 
solutions must aim to save scarce resources as well as to satisfy needs, the 
individual must be willing to undergo trial-and-error processes (learning) and be 
able to embrace new approaches if they offer a better fit (creativity). Needs have 
not only a personal and social dimension but also an ecological one (nature) and 
can be material or immaterial; one example is an aesthetical enjoyment of nature 
(emotion). 
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Table 1: Ideas of the human being and their potential for environmental 
sustainability 
 
*REMM: Resourceful Evaluative Maximizing Man 
Among the contrasted ideas, only the multiple self seems to have the potential to 
learn sustainable behaviour. However, due to its limitations (e.g. contradictory 
cognition, lacking conscious relationship with nature), it will fail to do so. 
Against that background, there is a need for more context-related approaches 
because the human being is the essential actor to keep the earth system – and 
therefore his or her own security – safe. Or as Messner, Guarín and Haun (2013) put 
it: 'Avoiding catastrophic climate change that can threaten human civilization as we 
know it may be the ultimate cooperation challenge that our species has yet faced'. 
Let me mention some additional interdisciplinary examples:  
 Siebenhüner (2001) himself proposes the homo sustinens, who 
incorporates attributes of the multiple self but is able to act according to 
the 'storyboard' described above. It draws from earlier approaches like 
the homo oecologicus (Meinberg 1995) and the sustainers (Dobb 1995). 
The goal is to constitute an idea for the science and management of 
environmental sustainability.  
 The homo cooperativus (Debiel, Leggewie et al. 2014) and, more specified, 
the homo reciprocans (Messner, Guarín et al. 2013) is a complex and 
cooperative person whose preferences might shift with situations and 
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(cultural) contexts. Behavioural outcomes can result from self-interested 
instrumental rationality, enlightened self-interest, altruism, and 
emotions. The individual is able to be reflective, which stimulates learning 
and adaptation through trial and error.  
Apart from their context-relatedness, how are these approaches different from 
the others? The homo sustinens and the homo reciprocans concentrate on 
behavioural mechanisms: For the societal and political sphere, Siebenhüner 
proposes the mechanisms of a Western learning society and analyses how the 
latter support the transformation of an individual into a sustainable self during his 
or her span of life. This makes societal structures and strategies as well as 
education itself with its policies, cultures and concepts extremely important. The 
pedagogical concept includes elements such as enlargement of the subjective 
capability to decide and act; ethical-moral education; systemic thinking; emotional 
learning; reflections on an idealized human being; social education; and learning to 
be creative. The transformation ends when the acting self has learnt how to learn 
and is able to not only adapt his or her actions and goals (double-loop learning) but 
also his or her cognitive processes, if need be, for improved sustainable behaviour 
(deutero learning).  
While Siebenhüner seeks to transform the individual via education and training, 
Messner, Guarín and Haun already assume that humans are naturally cooperative 
beings and propose seven basic mechanisms that have proved to maintain 
cooperation in small groups over time. The proposed 'cooperation hexagon'—with 
reciprocity at its core—is based on four necessary mechanisms: Communication as 
a means to develop trust; reputation as a means to determine trustworthiness; 
fairness as a prominent feature of ethically acceptable interactions; and trust itself 
as a belief about a highly probable reciprocation. Especially in larger groups, two 
additional mechanisms are needed: Enforcement and we-identity. Punishment 
enhances cooperation when reputation-building is not possible and rewards 
promote it. We-identity refers to a similarity that helps to identify and find 
potential cooperation partners and is either based on a given homogeneity 
between people or is constructed through language and joint narratives.  
Messner, Guarín and Haun argue that these mechanisms are 'underprovisioned' 
for the interface between interpersonal and interorganizational interests when not 
only individuals and small groups but also larger political and societal networks are 
concerned. Adapting the named mechanisms for such a context could then not only 
theoretically but also practically help to tackle global governance challenges more 
effectively. 
In the case of the homo sustinens and the homo cooperativus, there is relatedness 
with nature and a dedicated and context-based discussion of mechanisms and 
policies. Nevertheless, for the problem at hand, they are rather complementary. 
This is because both of them neglect motivational processes. To put it in a 
simplified way: While Siebenhüner sees an ethical claim as the starting point for the 
development of self and further actions, Messner, Guarín and Haun take motivation 
as given in a person who is naturally cooperative. 
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3.2 Assessing the Input from Literature for Further Analysis 
Let me reflect on what has been discussed so far. I argued that the 
implementation of global environmental politics needs individual change behaviour 
and therefore an understanding of corresponding motivational processes. The 
challenge itself was described through three 'cognitive blindspots'. The latter refer 
to the motivation to adopt a certain change behaviour; to keep it going despite 
informational and cognitive bounds; and to make it overcome challenges from self-
referential and systemic complexity. If successful, change behaviour produces 
knowledge sharing, mutual learning and systemic adaptations.  
What conclusions can be drawn for the problem at hand?  
 Analyzing narratives helps to get a more realistic picture of the human 
being. The reason is that approaches like the homo narrans relate to body 
and thought processes and those values that underlie actions. Such 
approaches can therefore close all 'cognitive blindspots' if an individual is 
conscious of them. And they offer an increased awareness in cautiously 
dealing with any pre-analytic scientific vision. Idealized types of 
personalities, too, are helpful for the understanding of actors, their 
patterns of relationships and processes of interaction. Yet there are limits 
to the use of personality traits here because every bundle of features 
looks like a micro-cosmos of its own, prompting Rogers (2003) himself to 
state: 'Personality variables associated with innovativeness have not yet 
received full research attention, in part because of difficulties in 
measuring personality dimensions in field interviews'. And what do 
comparative degrees such as 'greater rationality' or 'stronger empathy' 
really mean? Is there always some kind of rationality at work as well as 
some kind of proper behaviour? Or can strong emotions bypass the 
rational as well as the moral mind? Thus, who is the human being? While 
the homo narrans deals with motivation too implicitly to turn it into an 
explanatory factor, adopter categories seem to run into deeper 
methodological problems once human mind and context gain in 
complexity. 
 Approaches which idealize and model human behaviour help in a 
structured way to achieve a better understanding of elements within the 
complexity of the human mind and its (re-)actions: There was the 
confirmed importance of motivation as behavioural driver (homo 
oeconomicus maturus); informational and cognitive bounds and 
psychological reactions to the latter (boundedly rational human being); 
cognition with a varying (re-)interpretation of social relationships (homo 
culturalis); and a complex cognitive structure which involves ambivalence 
and motivational conflicts (multiple self). Overall, the multiple self seems 
to be closest to human nature and adequate as a baseline for the further 
understanding in this paper although it comes with the lack of ecological 
reflections. 
 The homo sustinens and the homo reciprocans are among the few 
approaches which explicitly connect the human being with environmental 
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politics. And both of them share a fundamental 'belief' in mechanisms 
which could make practice work towards proposed directions: In a 
detailed elaboration, Siebenhüner proposes the mechanisms of a 
Western learning society for his idealized individual, although the 
question has yet to be discussed whether these mechanisms are universal 
ones or exclusively belong to the Western 'geography of thoughts' as 
described by Nisbett (Nisbett 2003); Messner, Guarín and Haun assume a 
naturally cooperative being for their reciprocity-related mechanisms and 
thus reduce the complex structure of the homo cooperativus. To that 
extent, all authors tend to discuss how to make an already motivated 
person act into the right direction and not to explain how to reach the 
underlying motivation. To give an example: If cooperation is based on 
reputation as a mechanism to identify trustworthy cooperation partners 
and to expect a fair solution, do enforcement effects spill over on other 
motivated actions? Are the same motivational signals perceived 
differently when context conditions vary? And what does this mean for 
human cognition, learning and an individual's transformative capacity?  
Overall, I found new and inspiring contributions. Yet the review had its own 
challenges. Not all approaches distinguish between ideas and models. In some, 
motives and motivation are treated as synonyms and their transformation into 
cognitive processes remains unclear. In such cases, neuropsychological insights on 
cognitive processes are 'add-ons' rather than integral parts, although this is not 
always pointed out. When given as add-ons, the terminology might even cause 
confusion when meanings mingle; this is the case with beliefs, which, in sociology, 
for example, are linked with cultural habits (Rogers 2003), whereas in cognitive 
science, beliefs describe efforts and abilities to reach a goal (Ryan and Deci 2000).  
The most promising idea, where all cognitive blindspots are recognized, is the 
multiple self. But if all individuals are so ambivalent and full of motivational 
conflicts, what is it that breaks the inner motivational circle and provides an 
opening for enduring change behaviour? Do some people have better chances of 
escaping cognitive ambivalence and dissonance than others? If so, who are they? 
After having reviewed a wide array of literature, there was one question in 
particular which bothered me: Is it really possible to describe human motivation in a 
way which helps to find answers for eco-sustainable change behaviour?  
There is rich evidence, especially from psychological and cognitive research, that 
motivation is fundamental for the human willingness to transform information into 
knowledge and the latter into adaptive learning. In the following, I will attempt to 
find some answers through a sequential arrangement of the motivational process. 
This may also produce a new awareness of 'what is needed', 'when' and 'how' as 
input from politics. 
Please note: This research had its own time constraints and reached beyond the 
author's own disciplinary borders, which can limit the depth of a critical analysis. 
And there are certainly many additional and very useful studies which are still 
undiscovered by the author. Thus, the following approach is still in its infancy. It 
needs to be examined, corrected, refined and led into adulthood.  
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4 The Proposal: Sequencing Human Motivation for New 
Insights on Eco-sustainable Change Behaviour 
… the mind is a wanderer, a source of 
fantasy and an easy captive for puzzles, 
mysteries and daydreams. 
Schelling (1986)  
4.1 Human Motivation and its Sub-processes 
In the following, human motivation is sequenced through each cognitive stage 
which it must pass to go from behavioural intentions to actual behaviour. The goal 
is to gain a new perspective on eco-sustainable change behaviour. How? First, such 
an approach is a reminder that behavioural outcomes come with the flux of being 
or rather feeling (re-)motivated as a human being, which goes beyond traditional 
approaches of fixed behavioural assumptions and incentive systems. Second, 
letting insights from the previous chapter circulate more freely can help to find 
new links, showing where and how they fit together if systemic conditions become 
more complex. As human cognition is (neurobiologically) universal, gained insights 
can be assumed to be valid for all people and therefore applicable for the whole 
diffusion system of global cooperation.  
The understanding of motivation which has been reached so far is as follows: 
Motivation is structured through personality and context factors and through its 
stages. Flows start when an individual recognizes incoming stimuli as something 
relevant. Once information is selected, processed and linked to anticipated goals or 
desired end states, the individual develops favourable knowledge or attitudes, 
which after internal and/or external confirmation stimulate learning and adaptive 
behaviour. One can easily imagine that throughout this process, cognitive 
capabilities (e.g. attention, perception, introspection, problem-solving) are needed 
and accompanied by manifestations like sensory experience, emotions, images, 
thoughts, inner speech or a feeling of will.  
As shown in Figure 5, there are two main motivational processes with their sub-
parts, which I have identified so far:  
A. Basic motivational processes:  
 a. Signaling value through incoming stimuli;  
 b. Screening of stimuli for knowledge creation;  
 c. Bounds in and direction of decision-making.  
B. Motivational feedback loops:  
 a. Screening for confirming stimuli;  
 b. Processing of knowledge for learning activities;  
 c. Bounds in and direction of adaptive behaviour.  
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Figure 5: Human motivation as structure and flux 
 
Based on Burger-Menzel (2014a) 
 
In order to facilitate these processes, self-regulatory efforts are needed all the 
time. Evolutionary psychology confirms that very simple learning may be mindless 
as in classical conditioning but 'value codes within the brain need to be felt if they 
are going to be optimal heuristics for learning' (Panksepp 2007). Yet, given the 
scope of this paper, there have to be limits to discussion. Like all analytical 
frameworks, mine remains an abstraction of reality. Some factors are stressed, 
others relegated to the background. When focusing on psychological and 
neurobiological findings on individual cognition and relating them to the socio-
economic and political dimension, one must bear in mind that one is not reducible 
to the other.  
4.2  Decoding Cognitive Matchmaking, Knowledge Creation and Decision-taking  
a.  Signaling value through incoming stimuli 
According to Rogers (2003), '[s]ome observers claim that an individual plays a 
relatively passive role when being exposed to awareness-knowledge about an 
innovation'. And he concludes that it is the predisposition of an individual which 
influences his or her behaviour towards a communication message and the effects 
that such a message is likely to have. Such a predisposition is motivation, which 
scans (single) motives for their relevance. Motivation grows if an activity is central 
to the individual and makes an activity interesting and likely to be performed; thus, 
the 'signal' of the incoming stimulus gets stronger. 
Motives are therefore determinants of motivation and they come with needs. An 
incoming signal, which serves to indicate a strong need, will be more easily 
recognized in its 'value message' than a stimulus, which is directed towards a 
relatively weak need. Or as Chong (2013) puts it: 'Instrumental reasoning and self-
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interested decision-making are more likely to be manifest when people can see 
that a policy will have a significant impact on their lives'. A negative value can be 
expressed as 'costs' (direct costs, indirect costs, opportunity costs). If motivation is 
lacking, the corresponding activity is not executed or not executed adequately. 
The early explanatory focus was on 'basic biological needs or drives connected to 
survival and procreation (e.g. hunger, thirst, sex) and extrinsic rewards or 
punishments' (Ryan and Deci 2000) that energize individuals towards reaching a 
particular goal. Instrumental values, which make an individual perceive nature as 
something important, are linked, for example, to personal income levels; 
consumption expenditures and living standard; employment situation; or life 
expectancy including available medical services and water and air quality (OECD 
2000).  
Additionally, there are needs for a good life and corresponding stimuli 
(eudemonic values). A bureaucrat whose professional utility cannot only be 
described through pecuniary income (e.g. increased salary) and more prestige (e.g. 
leadership position) but also through a comfortable and conflict-free job life (e.g. 
slack) and non-pecuniary income (e.g. increasing size of office), as in models of 
public choice theory (Fritsch, Wein et al. 1999), certainly falls into this category. 
Eudemonic values, which include nature and go beyond material wealth, are, for 
example, recreational stays as well as other amenities which positively relate to 
eco-services. The state of Bhutan names for example the conservation of nature 
and sustainable development as two pillars of its Gross National Happiness and 
does regular studies on these matters (McDonald 2010). Nevertheless, a good life 
can be combined with economic values if the provision of tourism produces 
regional income, for example. 
However, and as discussed before, value categories go beyond instrumental and 
eudemonic ones. Krebs (1996 in Wiegleb 2003) mentions moral and absolute 
intrinsic values as complementary categories, which can have pervasive influence 
on the individual in his or her relationship with nature. Table 2 below gives a brief 
overview on all value categories. 
Table 2: Values with potential as nature-related stimuli 
Value category Origin of value
Instrumental values Values stemming from direct utility (e.g. food, raw 
material, medicines) or indirect utility (e.g. ecological 
function of nature) 
Eudemonic values Values stemming from individual well-being ('the good 
life'), including aesthetic, emotional and religious values 
Moral values Values stemming from responsibilities for others 
(including stewardship) 
Absolute 'intrinsic 
values' 
Values stemming from an object's features alone 
(e.g. diversity, individuality) 
Based on Wiegleb (2003); own translation 
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Moral values stem from a need for social relatedness. According to Elster (2007), 
such moral values include 'the norm to help others in distress, the norm of equal 
sharing, and the norm of 'everyday Kantianism' (do what would be best if everyone 
did the same)'. While the first two norms relate to social behaviour alone, the third 
norm can be interpreted as one with potential for environmental care. But can 
moral values really be perceived as strong incoming stimuli like instrumental or 
eudemonic values? Hume (1739, reprint 1978) observes: 'Morals excite passions, 
and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this 
particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason'.  
Thinking of environmental activists, for example, there certainly can be moral 
stimuli which trigger passion for the protection of nature. 
Absolute intrinsic values can activate those inner needs that make people 
perform an activity for its own sake rather than as a means to an end. Wrong goal-
setting can then be a negative stimulus and lead to demotivation (Frey and 
Osterloh 2002). Overall, values of intrinsic importance can have impressive 
consequences when the 'conventional work-play dichotomy does not apply' 
anymore because people 'don't perceive their work as duty or investment, but play 
time' (Choe 2006). And they can make people feel passionate about and get 
engaged in even seemingly impossible tasks that otherwise would not be tackled 
by them. Such intrinsically relevant stimuli are, for example, a self-satisfying joy of 
discovery or of one's own competence.  
Yet setting the 'right' stimuli is a challenging matter. On the one hand, every 
person has various value sets at the same time. As Elster (1986) stresses: 'Each of 
us seems to be split between a private and a public self'. The 'economic man' within 
us strives for personal hedonic satisfaction. He regards other people as so many 
means to his own selfish ends—or as constraints and obstacles in his pursuit of 
happiness. The 'social man', by contrast, is governed by moral and social norms'. 
Surely, cultural codes change over time, partly in response to changing needs and 
circumstances. And surely, individuals can rebel against these codes. But Clayton 
and Radcliffe (1996) confirm: 'As we are a social species, we generally find it hard to 
exist without group recognition and support. When people reject a given norm, 
therefore, they usually do it by adopting the behavioural norms of a deviant sub-
group with similar views within the larger community'.  
On the other hand, and as an additional risk to consistent choices, a stimulus from 
one value category can be affected and even crowded out by a stimulus from 
another category. This has been researched for creative people in particular. If 
extrinsic stimuli are mixed with strict rules, time restrictions and sometimes even 
material rewards, creators with strong 'ego boundaries' and therefore a dislike of 
externally imposed rules are likely to feel a conflict of 'control versus autonomy' 
(Andreasen 2005). Ryan and Deci (2000) describe it as follows: 'Rewards are one 
important means through which people attempt to control others, but there are 
numerous other means of control and all of them appear to run the serious risk of 
undermining people's intrinsic motivation, conceptual learning, problem solving, 
creativity, and generosity towards others'. And not only instrumental and 
eudemonic values but also moral values can conflict with intrinsic motivational 
factors. Ryan and Deci add: 'In a culture that places strong emphasis on rewards, 
there will be an enticing pull to orient toward external rather than internal cues 
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and to internalize the importance of rewards and their accompaniments'. An 
intrinsically motivated person would then feel rather inclined to seek activities, 
which are occasioned and rewarded by other people's actions and responses like 
compassion.  
How does the human mind deal with these challenges? How does it really match 
motives and values with the motivational features of situations, selecting some 
information as decision-relevant and other information as not?  
b.  Screening of stimuli for knowledge creation 
Exposure to incoming stimuli can be described as receptiveness to raw sensory 
data, which must be selected and processed in the brain into knowledge for 
decision-making. How does cognitive matchmaking work? And what can be derived 
from that for describing motivated and nature-oriented change behaviour? In the 
following, the discussion will briefly focus on the composition of preferences and 
on the consistency and potential instability of their order. 
The composition of preferences serves as a filter through which incoming signals 
are screened. It reflects a person's desires and goals according to given 
motivational priorities. While substantive preferences 'relate to specific pairs of 
options, such as a preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate or for one 
political candidate over another', formal preferences cover a wider scope and are 
linked to 'the rate of discounting of the future, risk aversion, loss aversion, and the 
like' (Elster 2010).  
For an individual to act in a way which is most likely to maximize net utility, 
preferences have to be consistent and the capacity to process all incoming 
information has to be unlimited. People with whom the individual has social 
relationships can influence the building of these preferences but not the decision-
taking itself (Siebenhüner 2001). A social context is then a field where an 
individual's personality plays out rather than a disposition within the person.  
Yet even seemingly consistent choices to maximize one's own utility need not 
relate to egoism. Sen (1982) identifies two cases where own-interest orientation 
has different causes and calls for a clearer formulation of meta preferences. First, 
revealed preferences might only express that a consistent chooser is concerned 
with his own interests due to 'the fact that his own consumption bundle—or that of 
his family—is the only bundle over which he has direct control in his acts of choice'. 
Second, there are two types of preferences. While one type of preferences does 
not trigger action although the individual is affected by the situation of others 
(subjective preferences), another type of preferences may even lead to counter-
preferential actions in order to change such a situation (moral-based preferences). 
Sen describes it with the following words: 'If the knowledge of torture of others 
makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally 
worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to make it 
stop, it is a case of commitment'.   
This turns the discussion of consistent preference orders and their interpretation 
into a challenge as well. Additionally, preferences must be enlarged by 
propensities, which stem from the alternative value categories discussed above. 
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But the more is included into a preference set, the higher the risk of its 
(unexpected) inconsistencies when there are, for example: 
 Motivational conflicts due to multiple goals, as in the case of extrinsic 
versus intrinsic motivation (Frey and Osterloh 2002);  
 Varying risk-utility perceptions, which depend on the informational 
context, e.g. the net benefit of defection versus the net benefit of 
cooperation before and after being caught, as in the case of the 
prisoner's dilemma (Mag 1990);  
 Altruism, which is per se non-reciprocal but might be played out as 
altruistic competition, i.e. people 'compete to behave more altruistically 
than others and establish an altruistic reputation'; altruism then can be a 
strategy to find cooperation partners because 'if altruism is to act as a 
signal that makes the receiver behave preferentially towards the altruist, 
then it must be a reliable indicator of a person's resources, motivations, 
and/or intentions' (van Vugt, Roberts et al. 2007); 
 An aversion to violating cultural codes, which leads to an inversion of 
reason where to put self-interest within the motivational hierarchy. An 
individual might then cover his or her motivation with a motivation that is 
higher up in the hierarchy of social values, which Elster (2009) calls the 
'hypocrisy' within the multiple self. Tocqueville (2004 in Elster 2009) 
illustrates: 'Americans ... are pleased to explain nearly all their actions in 
terms of self-interest properly understood. They will obligingly 
demonstrate how enlightened love of themselves regularly leads them to 
help one another out and makes them ready and willing to sacrifice a 
portion of their time and wealth for the good of the state. On this point I 
believe that they often fail to do themselves justice';  
 Shifting motivational impulses because motives are 'latent dispositions: 
over time they wax and wane in response to internal states and external 
opportunities' (Winter 2013).  
Some motives are even harder to detect but can come with a strong motivational 
effect such as (Ainslie 1986):  
 Rewards, which an individual perceives as important but come as 
unexpected by-products (e.g. laughter);  
 Seemingly value-less factors, which make people sometimes fail to 
maximize their expected incomes or minimize their costs (e.g. irrational 
value of friendship);  
 Temporary preferences for inferior rewards, which even include 
consenting to undergo pain (e.g. religious rituals);  
 An individual’s abstinence in rewarding him- or herself in areas where he 
or she is freely able to do so (e.g. self-discipline as limiting factor);  
 Rewards, which lose their power with delay or repetition (e.g. need for 
something fashionable). 
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Rorty (2010) therefore makes a 'plea for ambivalence' when referring to the 
human being and its 'different priorities in different contexts, without having 
criteria for distinguishing contexts, let alone well-formed principles for ranking 
compartmentalized preferences'.  
Schelling (1984), Nobel Laureate in Economics in 2005 for his contributions to 
game theory, which focus on cooperation and conflict behaviour, describes his own 
cognitive challenges as follows: 'An unavoidable question is whether I could be 
happier if only I could believe things more favourable, more complimentary, more 
in line with my hopes and wishes, than what I believe to be true. ... Or it might be 
accomplished by improving the mix of my beliefs by dropping out—forgetting—
some of the things that cause me guilt, grief, remorse, and anxiety. Whether I 
would be happier, whether my welfare should be deemed greater, with those 
improved beliefs is one of the questions; another is whether, if I had the choice, I 
would elect a change in my beliefs. Set aside for the moment the question whether 
there is any way I could do that. The question whether I would choose to revise the 
contents of my mental library, so that even in my most rational thinking I would 
come to more positive conclusions, is independent of whether or not we know the 
technology by which it might be done.' 
Global cooperation needs people who perceive politically set stimuli as a match 
with their given preferences, regardless of how consistent or complete the latter 
are. How can politics deal with the ambivalent being who is already struggling with 
cognitive 'matchmaking' at an early stage? What does all that mean for 
corresponding decision-making? 
c.  Bounds in and direction of decision-making 
Basic motivational processes end when the cognitive self decides to adopt a 
certain (global) policy goal or to reject it. As mentioned above, such a decision can 
only be taken in a frictionless way if there is optimal information as well as limitless 
cognitive capacity. 'A perfectly rational individual has a complete and coherent set 
of preferences, gathers an appropriate amount of information depending on the 
significance of choice, forms beliefs about the alternatives that reflect the relevant 
information or evidence needed to make the decision, and chooses the action that 
is optimally related to his beliefs and goals' (Chong 2013).  
But what happens to the decision mechanism if the information is too difficult to 
be understood right away or too much information has to be filtered? Such a 
procedural rationality results in optimization, which is more satisfying than 
maximizing (Simon 1976). 
According to Lindstädt (2006), informational bounds come in three forms: There 
can be a lack of information; too much information but appropriate for definite 
selections; or too much information but too indefinite for selection purposes. Once 
incoming stimuli match given preferences, information is processed into 
knowledge for decision-making. This is associated with costs. There can be costs for 
gaining more information (e.g. information search with time and number of 
personal contacts) and/or costs for the enlargement of information-processing 
capacities (IT infrastructure, evaluation of data quality). Such informational bounds 
and their consequences have stimulated a huge number of scientific contributions 
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(Mag 1990), e.g. decision rules for situations with imperfect information 
(uncertainty) or imperfect information with no probability at all (insecurity).  
In addition to these categories, Lindstädt discusses indirect costs that occur due 
to 'physiological, psychological and cognitive stress'. This stress results from a 
'misfit' between an individual and the challenge, which has to be handled and might 
cause threat or harm and loss. People try to avoid such stress, e.g. through 
premature cognitive closure or a hardening of those decision-relevant categories 
which can threaten self-esteem. As reasoned by Taylor (1987): 'Self-esteem is the 
unstable component of self-concept. Threats to self or self-esteem are experienced 
as anxiety and result in defensive maneuvers'. Thus, decision-making can even 
challenge how an individual perceives itself (self-concept) because such a self-
concept 'is gradually developed and changed through transactions with other 
persons, and it remains dependent to a large extent on the reflected appraisals of 
other persons' (Getzels 2008).  
It is no surprise that people have developed mechanisms or rules to deal with 
informational and cognitive stress in decision-making by simplifying tasks. They do 
so in three ways (Huddy, Sears et al. 2013):  
 Through decomposition, i.e. breaking a decision down into components, 
with each component presumably easier to evaluate than the whole 
decision;  
 Through editing, i.e. ignoring of relevant aspects;  
 And through heuristics, i.e. problem-solving strategies that are often 
automatically or unconsciously employed.  
The existence of these decision-making tools is backed by neuroscience. While 
incoming stimuli are stored and processed in the area of the short-term memory 
(working memory), formerly selected and processed stimuli are stored in long-term 
memory. The retrieval from long-term memory is a function of what was associated 
with the stimulus then, to which pre-existing schemes it was related, or how 
frequently the individual had been exposed to the same stimulus (Huddy, Sears et 
al. 2013). Thus, neurobiology mirrors what can be observed as practiced cognitive 
shortcuts.  
Usually, global cooperation increases given complexities because it adds 'new' to 
'old' with a tendency to destroy the latter over time. These dynamics come under 
conditions of risk or insecurity. Additionally, it requires diverse stakeholders to 
cooperate with each other and thus bridge (cultural) context gaps through 
communication and knowledge transfer. Does all this support Siebenhüner's 
proposition to educationally and culturally prepare people for environmental 
sustainability? Certainly, education and training increase absorption capacities and 
lower rational bounds. But can they really erase cognitive shortcuts, which 
undermine sustainable change behaviour? And what about professionals who, even 
if academically trained, have gotten used to their cognitive 'safe house' and are no 
longer able to switch perspectives? Can, for example, institutional conditions do to 
professionals (e.g. bureaucrats) what academic training does to students familiar 
with the idea of the homo oeconomicus? 
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Additionally, there is a growing consensus in neuroscience that emotions—which 
have been excluded from idealizations of the 'economic being' for so long—are 
interdependent with rationality, i.e. they can help to reach quick and presumably 
rational decisions. Gross Stein argues that it is even intuitive and associative 
decision-making, based on emotions, that comes first, before reason and rule-
governed decision-making kick in. While emotion-based decision-making is 
preconscious, automatic, fast, effortless but slowly changing due to strong 
emotional bonds, the second system is conscious, reflective, slow and flexible 
(Gross Stein 2013). If emotions are strong, they can bypass beliefs (e.g. passionate 
killing vs. religious belief that killing is sin) or even reverse preferences (e.g. fear-
driven desertion by a soldier who volunteered for army service) as Elster (2010) 
points out.  
Consequently, Ainslie (1986) describes a decision-maker as someone who is 
'capable of voluntary action', 'certainly of responsible agency' and 'rational, at least 
by prudential and formal criteria', but also someone who fulfils all these 
requirements, can follow a large variety of motivational determinations and 'can, in 
the event, be voluntarily swept, against his better judgment, to follow a 
charismatic leader, allow himself to be cast into a role that does not coincide with 
his preferences, to be moved by empathy or by the excitement of crowd 
behaviour'. The following figure tries to illustrate action tendencies of emotions by 
differentiating between 'normal' emotions as the first and fast decision-taking 
mechanism and 'strong' emotions, which point to biased or even contradictory 
behaviour. 
Figure 6: Emotions and their action tendencies 
 
Based on Burger-Menzel (2014b) 
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Thus, while normal emotions can lead to preconscious, automatic, fast and 
effortless decision-making, strong emotions tend to send the human mind on 
'detours'. Or as Schelling (1986) puts it: '[T]he mind is a wanderer, a source of 
fantasy and an easy captive for puzzles, mysteries and daydreams'. Can 
environmental politics pre- or counteract and, if the answer is yes, in which way? 
Can politics make people not only cognitively less overwhelmed but also 
emotionally more intrigued by it? Is communication the clue to it all? 
4.3  Motivational Feedback Loops, Learning and Adaptive Behaviour in Complex 
Systems  
a.  Screening for confirming stimuli 
As described by Rogers, there seems to be a decider's need to get her/his choices 
confirmed. This is especially true in a world of uncertainty and therefore risk and it 
is all the more relevant if internal motives can shift or even fade away. 'When a 
person changes, he may regret some of the choices he made before the change. 
Also, he may find that he does not want to stick to his earlier decisions' (Elster 
1986). An individual will then check whether the motives concerned relate to 
durable interests. This is also confirmed by neuroscience, which describes 
consciousness as 'a process that is continuous but continually changing' (Edelman 
and Tononi 2000). 
If a decision is confirmed, it may gain weight, which makes it not so easily rejected 
in the future and better retrieved from memory. Steedman and Krause (1986) point 
out that 'people do not often change drastically over a very short space of time 
(which is why one can refer to their characters)... one can say that a "person is 
constructed by choices he has made sequentially through time"'. 
Confirmations are produced in the inner world (autonomy) and/or through the 
outer world (interrelationship). Only the most autonomous individuals will not seek 
outer reinforcement at all. But as discussed above, no person seems to be without 
membership of some face-to-face or reference group. 'Even the most independent 
of pure scientists ... publish ... their work' and thereby become liable to group 
influence from peers and critics (Getzels 2008). Lebow (2005) even states: 
'Individual identity is historically conditioned, took millennia to emerge and has 
been regarded as unnatural by most people for most of its existence' and that 
'[m]odern society's emphasis on individualism and free choice creates an 
entrenched predisposition to exaggerate the uniqueness of the inner self'.  
As in the basic motivational sequence, confirmation mechanisms entail 
awareness-building, gathering and processing of information, and remembering or 
forgetting.  Reinforcement itself can happen intentionally or unintentionally. And 
as in the basic motivational sequence, it is here that the mechanisms of the 
cooperation hexagon become highly relevant.  
Small groups in particular offer shared cultural codes and a transparent 
environment to rein in their members, e.g. by means of tit-for-tat strategies. In 
these social environments, reputation matters a great deal, as do emotional 
enforcement mechanisms, which produce shame, guilt or sensitivity to social 
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sanctions within an individual and induce him or her to interact in a code-
corresponding way. Udéhn (1993 in Siebenhüner 2001) describes the need to 
communicate as follows: 'One of the most significant and most consistent results 
of experimentation over the years is that cooperation increases dramatically if 
people are allowed to communicate before being subjected to a social dilemma'. 
Language is also highly important if groups get larger or if boundaries between 
different groups are spanned because 'language is a capacity that can build 
alliances in large, dispersed groups', e.g. through gossip about others, which 'tends 
to revolve around the status, achievements and failures of other people' (van Vugt, 
Roberts et al. 2007). Rogers (2003) confirms for the diffusion of innovations that 
'[i]n order to explain the effect of the critical mass on the adoption behaviour of a 
system's members it is useful to think about micro-level personal communication 
networks'. 
Through communication, confirmation can be sought in overt and verbally direct 
or in more subtle and non-verbal ways depending on culture (Nisbett 2003). 
Intercultural management literature describes this difference as the one between 
low-context communication (explicit language) and high-context communication 
(implicit language). If cultural differences between people are substantial and 
cross-cultural awareness is low, there can be cognitive dissonance for those who 
encode and decode communication messages (Deresky 2000). Both sender and 
receiver would then tend to ignore differences in attitudes, thought patterns and 
language features, which are directly or indirectly transported through 
communication. Creating a 'we-identity' in larger groups, as suggested by Messner, 
Guarín and Haun (2013), has to take the latter into account. 
It is essential for global cooperation to understand the nature of communication 
flows in and between personal networks and what determines how successfully 
someone relays a message to someone else. But what follows from the recapturing 
of minds through confirmation signals? How can communication build up cognitive 
patterns of recognition and thereby induce learning? What is learning? 
b.  Processing of knowledge for learning activities 
Positive confirmation leads to individual learning, while negative confirmation 
makes people forget the information that was dealt with. Learning itself produces 
changes within an individual, which can refer, for example, to a recombination of 
memory-stored information, the enlargement of knowledge, or the acquisition of 
new principles or skills. 
How do individuals learn and is it easy to reach learning goals? Let me refer back: 
Learning, which is intrinsically motivated, can be assumed to have its own rewards. 
Ryan and Deci (2000) point out that in a study by McGraw and McCullers (1979) 
participants who were rewarded, 'had a harder time thinking flexibly than did those 
who were not offered a reward'.  
But as discussed above, individuals are rarely autonomous. Knowledge creation 
mainly exists in a social context, which turns knowledge-sharing and learning into 
social interactions, i.e. knowledge-sharing, too, requires motivation (Quigley, 
Tesluk et al. 2007). This leads to reflective practices, which are learned and 
reproduced in communities of practitioners (Schoen 1983). Tomasello (2009) 
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identifies two cooperative processes that are critical for such a social mechanism: 
'First,... [t]eaching is a form of altruism, founded on the motive to help, in which 
individuals donate information to others for their use. ... Second, humans also have 
a tendency to imitate others in the group simply in order to be like them'. Panksepp 
(2007) adds the motive of affection and explains that the 'most effective 
reinforcers [of individual and cultural learning] are always accompanied by 
affective experience in humans'.  
Limits are set by the individual's cognitive capacity, the type of knowledge, which 
is learnt, and by the institutional conditions for learning (Burger-Menzel and Assadi 
2012). Basically, two types of knowledge can be distinguished: Tacit knowledge 
includes (technical) know-how and experience and is continuously learned through 
(professional) activities, most of the time subconsciously. Explicit knowledge is 
codified (e.g. through letters, numbers, symbols) and eases the perceptibility of 
knowledge and its exchange through communication. The less restricted 
knowledge flows are, e.g. through institutions such as traditions, norms and legal 
rules (e.g. intellectual property rights), the more one type of knowledge can enrich 
the other and stimulate need- and goal-oriented exploring, searching, selecting, 
learning, creating, memorizing and adjusting to new knowledge. Linking such inter-
personal learning processes creates another diverse net of communication paths. 
Against that background, it can be understood that the pedagogical concept of 
the homo sustinens goes beyond elements such as systemic thinking or creativity 
techniques. It also aims to enlarge the subjective capability to decide and (inter-) 
act, ethical-moral education, social education and emotional learning (Siebenhüner 
2001). The German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 2011), too, stresses 
the societal need to establish transformation as a new area of research and 
education ('transformation research and education') and to provide corresponding 
information, methods and technologies for its application ('transformative research 
and education').  
Many positive and normative endeavours in environmental studies aim to foster 
such a new paradigm. However, Maniates (2013) points out that there are still 
'surprisingly few places' in environmental studies where 'students explore the 
changing role of science and scientists in the struggle for sustainability. Such 
exploration might begin with how scientists better communicate their ideas in 
politically charged environments and then extend to deeper questions about the 
politics of expertise around contentious environmental issues'. And he identifies a 
particular challenge in this context: '[d]uring turbulent times, natural scientists and 
the insight they generate will be greeted with increasing skepticism and hostility'. 
This is even valid for disputes among scientists, who 'often exhibit human frailty, 
and issues of jealousy, greed, and the misuse of power may play a role in the fate of 
theories' (Gell-Mann 1994).  
Thus, also learning and knowledge creation can lead to (assumed) failure, 
cognitive stress and threaten a person's self-esteem. Such a threat will be lower if 
there are personality traits like intrinsically driven curiosity or a positive attitude 
towards uncertainty and risk. But how many people really prefer life in an 
environmental world full of unknowables, risks and crisis over options such as 
wishful thinking, ignorance or even denial? Can humans really effectively scale up 
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sustainability in times of constant environmental crisis? And if not, is systemic 
change out of the question until it is too late?  
c.  Bounds in and direction of adaptive behaviour within complex systems 
The motivational feedback loop ends when politically intended and learnt 
adaptation is tried out. Evolutionary development could then be described as a 
pattern of recurrent adaptive behaviour, which is based on trial and error. One 
challenge is to keep individual motivation going if the inner world is one of 
ambivalence. Another challenge is to keep it going if the inner world is additionally 
confronted with increasing outer complexity and less and less predictable (social) 
consequences. Both are manifestations of the third cognitive blindspot, which 
determines whether change behaviour really becomes sustainable or not (Chapter 2). 
What is meant by system complexity, a term referred to increasingly often in 
discussions? The analysis of complex adaptive systems is an interdisciplinary 
science in itself, with contributions from fields such as biology, sociology, 
neuroscience, computational sciences and physics. Therefore, complexity is a 
widely used term which can have different meanings for different researchers. The 
following definition might not find consensus but I consider it useful because it 
covers all the various elements. Edelman and Tononi (2000) claim that 
there are two aspects about which every expert on complexity 
agrees. First, to be complex, something must be composed of 
many parts that interact in a heterogeneous way. ... Second, it is 
now generally agreed that something that is completely random 
is not complex, nor is something that is completely regular. ... 
Only something that appears to be both orderly and disorderly, 
regular and irregular, variant and invariant, constant and 
changing, stable and unstable deserves to be called complex.  
Global cooperation in environmental politics has to cope with huge complexity. 
There are three layers full of risk- and crisis-related unknowables. The first layer is 
the earth system itself, which continuously changes in ways which are only partly 
understood. This concerns the atmosphere, biosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere 
and cryosphere and makes our planet—as a single connected system—
continuously 'changing on all spatial and temporal scales' (NASA 2014).  
The second layer consists of human-induced effects on the earth system with 
their often unpredictable consequences for human existence. There is, for 
example, the climate system, where carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have 
increased by 30 % since 1900 (NASA 2013), or the ecological system, where the 
total number of known species has decreased by 40 % between 1970 and 2000 
(DGVN 2014). O'Neill points out: 'Any country can emit greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere, or harvest fish from the high seas, without itself tipping the balance 
of the system's sustainability. However, once we examine the collective impact 
over time of all states treating the atmosphere or the oceans as their own private 
sink or source, we can see that these seemingly limited resources are, in fact, 
vulnerable' (O'Neill 2009). 
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As discussed in this paper, the third layer is the human being itself with its 
complex cognitive structure and behavioural ambivalence, which can be 'a sign of 
intellectual or moral laziness, masking vague or ambiguous judgements, a 
disinclination to press for clarity and precision in one's attitudes, values, and 
commitments. Yet even the most earnest moralist acknowledges that we are often 
conflicted about how to assign priorities among our multiple wholehearted 
commitments' (Rorty 2010).  
As a result of such complexities, perceived regularities might only be regularities 
among 'blanks' (e.g. overlooked regularities) or even misinterpretations (e.g. 
random features). With regard to human change behaviour, all three layers of 
complexity are interrelated. Why? If cognitive shortcuts (e.g. decomposition, 
editing, heuristics) and their pattern of learning already result from 'normal' 
cognitive stress, what happens if human nature has to cope with an even bigger 
complexity, which poses threats to life and even human existence? Does the 
'human risk factor' grow alongside environmental unknowables and threats of 
worst-case scenarios? Is there a point where people start to practice ignorance and 
even denial instead of adaptation, just to be able to live a 'normal' life?  
Notwithstanding an impressive number of eco-sustainable small-scale 
approaches around the world, let me pick some examples which illustrate this kind 
of human risk factor. For laypeople, Wibeck and Linnér conclude from their study 
with Swedish focus groups that the latter seem to be concerned about scientific 
uncertainty about climate change, uncertainty  about effective options for action  
(especially when related to individual lifestyle changes) and about limits to 
individual responsibility. And there seem to be attempts to make sense of climate-
related uncertainties in various ways by e.g. using the discussion of other 
environmental issues as a reference point or the credibility of messengers to 
determine the reliability of information. A past experience, however, where 
uncertainty was used as an 'excuse for not acting' can demotivate responsible 
citizens and delay their efforts to scrutinize the effectiveness of existing policies 
(Wibeck 2014). 
Consequently and as Gell-Mann (1994) points out for complex adaptive systems, 
the present might matter more to people than the future. An idea might be chosen 
just because it receives more positive feedback and establishes a dominant 
position, i.e. 'existing ideas entrench themselves and we have a tendency to 
interpret new information as confirmatory, so that we dig ourselves deeper and 
deeper into what may be a quite unsuitable hole'. Small acts of 'green' behaviour, 
which offer room for ambivalence, might then only serve to relieve a guilty 
ecological conscience and will remain without systemic impact, i.e. there is a 
'systemic behavior-impact gap' (Leonard 2013). This seems to match survey results 
for the USA which show that '[m]ore than 80 percent of Americans fail to 
consistently practice a small suite of environmentally sound behaviours, like 
reducing their energy use, driving smaller cars, and buying green products. Almost 
25 percent of Americans do not recycle, often because they cannot be bothered or 
believe that doing so makes little difference. More generally, consumer 
commitment to environmental practices appears to be waning' (Maniates 2013).  
To that extent, the analysis of environmental systems seems to be more 
challenging than the one of traditional innovation systems. The latter often has a 
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more restricted focus which is to watch the birth of a promising technology and to 
track if and how it has a persuasive effect on its diverse user groups due to e.g. 
productivity increases or better health.  
But many eco-behavioural choices do not seem to inspire and mobilize, especially 
when communicated within a 'science drama frame' (Wibeck 2014) or as 'politics of 
guilt' (Maniates 2013). Does this mean that multi-stakeholder partnerships in 
environmental cooperation will always produce an overall 'poor record of 
promoting systemic change' as stated by the UN (2013)? Or is some kind of 
systemic change already given but in such a fragmented way that it is hidden 
and/or misinterpreted as incoherence?  
Todd and Gigerenzer (2007) comment rather optimistically on adaptive 
challenges for the human mind, even if they are answered by heuristics: 
The adaptive processes of evolution, learning and culture have 
shaped human minds to be ecologically rational, relying on simple 
decision heuristics that confer the twin advantages of speed and 
accuracy in particular environments bearing exploitable patterns of 
information. Individuals can certainly be led to use heuristics in 
inappropriate environments and consequently make errors in 
reasoning, but this serves to show the boundaries of a mechanism's 
ecological rationality rather than its irrationality. When mind and 
world fit together, the evolved capacities, building blocks, and 
simple heuristics in our adaptive toolbox can guide us to make good 
choices in a fast and frugal manner. 
Using the approach of the homo narrans can certainly help to deepen the 
understanding of why in environmental systems people do what they do in the way 
they do it. In addition to eco-surveys, it is therefore 'crucial to analyse how people 
talk about their uncertainty' (Wibeck 2014). This is a reminder that humans should 
be understood in their behavioural totality and that the scientific power of 
interpretation should be handled with care.  
Let me sum up the understanding of the 'human risk factor' in environmental 
politics as something which can unpredictably shift between polarities such as:  
 Individual egoism versus nurturing social behaviour; 
 Attitudes dominated by personal autonomy versus hierarchical 
societies; 
 Logic-based action versus intuitive insights and empathic imagination; 
 Situational decision-making versus contextual dependency; 
 Centrality of temporal reference points (past, present, future) versus 
low importance of time construction; 
 Willingness to learn and change versus guarded identity and styles;  
 Direct communication versus an inclination towards more symbolic 
and interpretive understandings. 
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Environmental sustainability is long-term adaptation, which means that all basic 
motivational processes and their feedback loops have to run over and over again 
while the conditions for doing so continuously change.  
It seems that the higher the complexity and its unknowables, the higher the risk 
that a multiple self might (unconsciously) 'opt out' of sustainable change 
behaviour. However, one clue may be to better match the human mind with the 
world around. What could that mean? The last chapter presents conclusions on all 
the findings and attempts to develop them into first tentative proposals for the 
research field of environmental politics. 
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5  (Policy) Conclusions and Outlook 
The brain is a selectional system, and matching 
occurs within enormously varied and complex 
repertoires... the stimulus acts not so much by 
adding large amounts of extrinsic information 
that need to be processed as it does by 
amplifying the intrinsic information resulting 
from neural interactions selected and stabilized 
by memory through previous encounters with 
the environment. 
Edelman and Tononi (2000) 
5.1 Drawing Conclusions: Human Potential for Environmental Sustainability  
The inner world of the human being is cognitively complex. There are multi-value 
categories, motivational shifts and conflicts, selective retrievals of supportive 
memories and limits to data processing with behavioural consequences which can 
only partly be foreseen, if at all. Elements within the outer complexity can be (un-) 
consciously fearsome to humans. In this case, the human brain reacts with cognitive 
shortcuts or motivational swings, which can be spontaneous and inconsistent.  
Against that background, many scientific ideas and models of the human being 
produce illusions rather than an accurate representation of reality. Nevertheless, 
they are valuable. They have gradually shifted our understanding of 'us humans and 
the world' to the edge of knowledge, only to see that there is another universe to 
discover and learn about. For someone who was academically educated in math-
based economics and operations research at the University of Mannheim, such a 
journey from a presumably controllable world to the unknown is fascinating and 
fruitful. Yet my original intention to transfer insights on intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation from innovation system research to global cooperation research failed. 
This was due to the fact that there is not just one group of actors with specific 
personality traits, such as creators, but an overwhelming diversity of stakeholders, 
which spans all personal, professional and cultural boundaries. So I went back to 
review the literature on who is the human being. And when I could not find the 
answer to my question, I attempted a solution which I called 'sequencing human 
motivation'. Basic motivational processes and motivational feedback loops were 
identified as core processes. Both consist of a screening, processing and execution 
phase.  
In this chapter, let me summarize what has been achieved so far (conceptual 
findings):  
 Thinking in systemic terms acknowledges that actors are rich in attributes 
and social arrangements. Integrating this perspective into the analysis of 
global cooperation creates a new understanding of the human risk factor 
in complex environmental systems and requires an analysis of who 
humans really 'are', which is the subject of this paper. 
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 Going through all stages of sequenced motivation reveals how and to 
what extent scientific ideas and models were able to approach human 
complexity and—apart from the multiple self—what they (intentionally) 
left out.  
 Existential needs are of the utmost importance, especially if there is 
poverty. But even then, a lot of behaviour is occasioned and rewarded by 
other people's responses and/or relates to self-referential needs. In total, 
the inner world of a human being is more one of ambivalence than one of 
consistent rational behaviour. There is an individual sense of bounded 
rationality but it has tension with tacit and impulsively unordered 
rationales for action. Belief and value systems, which shape human 
behaviour, undergo contextual shifts because individuals can belong to 
multiple identity groups at any moment in their life. The emotional 
structure and dynamics of a person can either support or contradict 
rationality when expressed in action. Thus, modern ideas and models of 
the human being have to acknowledge that behavioural choices also 
involve unconscious incubation, cognitive shortcuts and intuitive 
interactions. 
 All this turns communication into an extremely important matter because 
it transmits key messages and know-how during the whole process of 
implementing (global) policies. By means of communication, the sender 
tries to convince the receiver through non-verbal signals and verbal 
messages that adopting a specific change is important while being aware 
of the receiver's needs and context restrictions. The major challenge is to 
avoid 'noise' in the communication channel, i.e. misunderstandings 
between sender and receiver due to (cultural) heterogeneity and / or 
shifting contexts (e.g. co-evolution of actors or new issue-links). Effective 
communication supports continuous reorganization to find the best fit 
between mind and environment. Modern studies of human behaviour 
have to take account of communication as an important mechanism 
which can support systemic change if practiced adequately. It is here that 
the methodological approach of the homo narrans and its insights could 
be exploited for corresponding groundwork. 
 The goal was to better understand cognitive blindspots, which turn 
humans into a risk factor in (global) environmental cooperation. The 
following figure shows the sequence of human motivation and exemplary 
explanations for such blindspots. The potential for moving from short-
term to long-term change behaviour is shown as a cycle. Once learning is 
executed as adaptation, the entire motivational sequence must be 
restarted in order to make change behaviour sustainable. If successful, 
there will be continuous learning through trial and error while the rerun 
experience becomes rooted in long-term memory for future retrieval. 
During every motivational cycle, humans can potentially 'opt out' at 
different stages e.g. through non-action (e.g. ignorance and forgetting), 
doubts (e.g. motivational conflicts) or some kind of stress (e.g. cognitive 
shortcuts such as decomposition, editing and heuristics). In order to 
better deal with cognitive blindspots in global cooperation, modern 
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studies on human behaviour must apply an interdisciplinary approach, 
which integrates the 'neurobiological brain' instead of using it as pure 
add-on. This should also be done at the risk of eclectic approaches, which 
by nature can only scratch the surface, underneath which there are 
beautifully elaborated and specialized insights. 
Figure 7: Examples of 'cognitive exit points' in human change behaviour 
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 Higher complexity seems to create a stronger tendency in humans to opt out of 
sustainable change behaviour. It also seems that scientific worst-case scenarios 
or politics of guilt are rather weak incentives to heal motivational circuit breaks 
and fallbacks and might even lead to non-action. Modern approaches which 
focus on human behaviour in global environmental systems have to reconsider 
how far laboratory-based conditions (e.g. experimental game theory) match the 
challenges on which conclusions are drawn. Notwithstanding the importance of 
all experimental contributions, long-term adaptation needs methodologies 
which track human behaviour in its totality as far as possible and do so over 
time (e.g. socio-economic panels combined with narrative research). 
Against this background, this paper offers limited contributions. Cognitive exit 
points can be relevant to different people in different ways and an additional 
behavioural understanding of professional categories (e.g. politicians, bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs, scientists, lobbyists) and of personality traits (e.g. early adopter, 
late adopter) certainly helps. Nevertheless, as all humans are 'run' by cognition 
regardless of how stakeholders vary, sequencing human motivation made me 
understand human behaviour much better and I hope to have adequately 
communicated it in writing. Let me now close with some ideas for future research 
agendas.  
5.2  Proposals for Future Research Agendas and Final Remarks 
What can be derived from the insights presented in this paper for the future 
analysis of global environmental politics? Here are some initial tentative proposals 
which may be suitable for transformation into hypotheses for empirical research: 
Basic motivational processes 
 Proposal 1: In order to motivate an individual to embrace environmental 
sustainability, a set of signals is needed. It must include more than one 
need category (multi-value set) and be relatively important in the 
individual's world (strong needs). Context gaps between people must be 
acknowledged, increasing the importance of decentralized diversity 
management (localized governance modes). This is especially important 
for intrinsically motivated change behaviour, which can be crowded out 
by external factors.  
 Proposal 2: As human motivation entails intra-personal bargaining 
situations but is sensitive to social responses, ethical norms help to adjust 
the subjective evaluation of incoming data and to direct the latter 
towards long-term interests. These norms should evolve as codes 
through discourses between stakeholders and be based on lifelong 
education and training (ethical coding and the moral mind). Violations of 
ethical codes should come at high social costs for the violator in order to 
be motivationally powerful (strong sanctioning of misbehaviour). 
 Proposal 3: The evolution of ethical codes must be supported by key 
actors (role-model behaviour) in order to shape the normative hierarchy 
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of motivations, which is given in every society. This is needed to render 
ethical codes effective and puts credibility issues such as corruption at 
the top of global agendas.  
 Proposal 4: People are averse to increasing complexity, both internal and 
external. Environmental policy therefore needs designs which serve as a 
conceptual anchor and use non-contradictory clues as stimuli (coherent 
but robust governance). Governance gaps between different policy fields 
can render such efforts useless and should be identified and dealt with 
(reduction of systemic fragmentation). 
 Proposal 5: Environmental politics can affect individual decision-making 
better if it services cognitive shortcuts and/or reduces the bounds which 
trigger them. Cognitive shortcuts, which are identified as opt-outs or 
contradictions to the system, should be redirected and integrated 
(considerate but experimental governance). This can be supported by 
positive emotional messages (political psychology). Bounds should be 
reduced by making the consequences of policies more visible (policy of 
early awareness) and the consequences better cognitively accessible 
(identification and enlargement of given absorptive capacities). 
 Proposal 6: The basic motivational process can only be influenced from 
the outside if information is mutually created and shared. As 
corresponding practices and skills vary between stakeholders and are of 
self-referential importance, effective communication depends on 
context-relatedness and peer-group environments (avoidance of 'noise' 
in the communication channel). This is also valid for all stages of 
motivational feedback oops. 
Motivational feedback loops 
There is cognitive dissonance after decision-making. Thus, motivational feedback 
loops face similar cognitive challenges as basic processes. There can be 
motivational conflicts, cognitive stress and shortcuts for some individuals and self-
rewarding learning and altruistic teaching for others. Additional proposals are:  
 Proposal 7: Politics can capture the mind positively or negatively. 
Incoming and confirming signals, which contain clues of value, can build 
up cognitive patterns of recognition and support so that the receiver of 
those signals can identify herself/himself with the policy concerned 
(policy of incremental steps).  
 Proposal 8: As shown above, humans interpret information in terms of 
their own attitudes and beliefs but are perceptive to social response. 
Politics should identify role models in all key areas and stimulate 
imitation processes through communication or other social signaling 
(identification and encouragement of imitative practices).  
 Proposal 9: Education and training can again be seen as an instrument to 
increase an individual's awareness of problem dimensions and his or her 
capacity to change behaviour. As cognitive stress can lead to 
corresponding shortcuts in learning as well, learning must go beyond 
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knowledge creation and include improved learning techniques to reduce 
risks to self-esteem (from know-how to learning to learn). 
 Proposal 10: If information is bounded, as in complex systems, decisions 
can no longer be predicted simply by drawing conclusions about 
alternatives and preferences but will be affected by the way decision-
makers attend to particular preferences, adaptive strategies and their 
consequences, as in learning systems. Key political actors therefore need 
their own learning and adaptation capabilities, an awareness of 
maladaptation and a willingness to stimulate changes—also in their own 
behaviour (reform of professional categories and required skills). 
There seem to be cognitive features in the human being that allow their 
transformation within complex systems. The clue seems to lie in matching the 
individual mind with the world around and to correspondingly reinterpret the 
performance qualities of decision-making.  
Against that background, the last proposal is the most challenging one: There has 
to be a nucleus of motivated people in order to set the ball rolling, and this nucleus 
must include public stakeholders, who would have to reform themselves and to put 
their own, often secure, life conditions at risk. Only if all stakeholders accept 
environmental policy goals as their priority and act upon it is there a chance of 
turning the (still) poor systemic change into a satisfactory one.  
That brings me to the end of this paper whose lengthy structure is like a narrative 
of my re-'search' at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation 
Research. Overall, it has been a challenging and exciting adventure across 
disciplinary borders, through which I learned how cognition is an integral part of 
human behaviour and how the latter is embedded in the understanding of systemic 
change. Although not all conclusions are new, they now derive from a fresh 
perspective on eco-sustainable change behaviour. And despite the fact that the 
core analysis had to be relatively abstract, there was context-relatedness 
throughout the paper which allowed proposals for global environmental policies at 
the end.  
There is no doubt that many relevant questions had to remain untouched. A 
follow-up paper will therefore pick up from here and put the 'cognitive self' deeper 
into the world of 'me and the others', with a focus on individual capabilities that are 
needed to scale up systemic change. This will enable effective policy formulation to 
be assessed against intra- and inter-diffusion patterns of groups and networks. 
Let me close with Ryan and Deci (2000): '... learning, creativity, and prosocial 
behavior [are] all variables that relate to the proactive qualities of human 
motivation and behavior'. Against that background, I wish to thank the Käte 
Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the University of 
Duisburg-Essen for its support and inspiring atmosphere during my six-month 
senior fellowship in 2014.*   
                                                             
*  Special thanks go to Prof. Dr Dirk Messner for rich discussions and intrinsically motivated 
curiosity for the same matters and to Prof. Dr Claudia Derichs, Dr Katja Freistein, Dr Felix 
Bethke and Dr Silke Weinlich for first helpful comments. 
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